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ENVIRONMENTAL ARTICLE
THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF PUBLIC
INFORMATION MANDATES UNDER FEDERAL
HAZARDOUS WASTE LAW: A POLICY ANALYSIS
Robert F. Blomquist*
INTRODUCTION

Public information laws generally mandate the private or public sectors to provide specific facts, data, documents, and reports to
various groups of people. These laws have been in existence for a
relatively short time. The origin of public information laws can be
traced back to legislation enacted during tl1e New Deal under
1
President Franklin D. Roosevelt. Public information laws have
proliferated since the introduction of federal securities laws and
state Blue Sky provisions which required disclosure of material financial data by. firms seeking to raise capital from the public sale
2
of stock. Examples of such laws, promulgated by both legislative
and judicial design, include product labeling requirements, product
warranty laws, land use planning provisions, freedom of information dictates, campaign reporting provisions, and bankruptcy disclosure requirements. Indeed, public information laws have become
more commonplace because of the nearly universal assumption
that dissemination of information is socially desirable and thus
leads to more efficient markets and more responsible behavior by
business, government, and individuals.
While public information laws can lead to socially desirable
results, insufficient attention has been devoted to analyzing how
these mandates may also create negative second-order consequences.3 The thesis of this article is that public environmental in* Professor of Law, Valparaiso University School of Law. J.D., Cornell Law School
(1977); B.S., University of Pennsylvania (Wharton School, 1973).
1. See generally J.M. BURNS, THE CROSSWINDS OF FREEDOM 25-26 (1989).
2. See The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988). See generally M. PARRINO, TRUTH IN SECURITIES: AN INTRODUCTORY GuiDE TO THE SECURITIES AcT OF 1933 23-25
(1968). The most noteworthy public information law is The Freedom of Information Act, 5
u.s.c. § 552 (1988).
3. See Blomquist, Solar Energy Development, State Constitutional Interpretation and
Mount Laurel II: Second-Order Consequences of Innovative Policymaking by the New
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formation alone does not necessarily result in public knowledge or
societal wisdom. Indeed, too much raw, undigested information can
lead to confusion, dissonance, and counterproductive social policy.
The Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
4
(SARA) ~ontains several public environmental information mandates with potential revolutionary legal and policy consequences.
This article is divided into three major parts and explores the nature and implications of these public information requirements.
First, the article provides general background on public. environmental information and disclosure laws. As part of this analysis,
the article sketches potential public policy roles and pathologies of
these generic types of laws. Second, the article describes three significant hazardous substance information programs under SARA:
(1) the chemical inventory and emissions provisions of Title III; (2)
the responsibilities of federal health officials both to develop toxicological profiles of the most troublesome toxic substances released
into the environment and to provide health assessments of existing
Superfund sites; and (3) the availability of federal funds for citizen
groups to obtain technical assistance for amassing, collecting, and
analyzing information on abandoned hazardous waste facilities. Finally, the article concludes with an analysis of the policy limits of
hazardous substan~ce information roles of SARA.
.

.

'

l.

POLICY ROLES AND PATHOLOGIES OF PUBLIC ENVIRONMENTAL
INFORMATION LAWS

Public environmental information laws have been a fixed feature of the American legal landscape since the passage of the Air
Pollution Prevention and Control Act amendments of 1970 (Clean
Air Act) 6 and the Federal Water Pollution and Control Act amend6
ments of 1972 (Clean Water Act). For example, under section 114
of the Clean Air Act, the Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is authorized to require "any person who
Jersey Supreme Court, 15

RuTGERS

OND-ORDER CONSEQUENCES:

(1969); D. HoROWITZ, THE

A

L.J. 573, 576-77 (1984). See generally R.

BAUER,

SEc-

METHODOLOGICAL ESSAY ON THE IMPACT OF TECHNOLOGY

CouRTS AND

SociAL PoLICY 292 (1977).

4. Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 96019675 (Supp. V 1987))~ SARA amended the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980.
5. Pub. L. 91-604, 84 Stat. 1676 (1970) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642
(1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
6. Pub. L. No. 92·500, 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 12511376 (1982 & Supp. V 1987)).
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owns or operates any emission source or who is subject to any requirement" of the Act to generate information necessary to fulfill
7
the EPA's mission in regulating air pollutants. The Administrator
is authorized by Congress to require operators to perform the following functions: ''(A) establish and maintain such records, (B)
make such reports, (C) install, use, and maintain such monitoring
equipment or methods, (D) sample such emissions ... and (E) provide such other information as may be reasonably require[d]."8
These records are available to the general public, subject to non9
disclosure if the records constitute trade secrets.
In language closely tracking the Clean Air Act, section 308 of
the Clean Water Act authorizes the EPA Administrator to ''require
the owner or operator of any point source to (i) establish and
maintain such records, (ii) make such reports, (iii) install, use, and
-m aintain such monitoring equipment or methods ... (iv) sample
such effluents ... and (v) provide such other information [as may
10
be] reasonably require[d]" to carry out the purposes of the Act.
The Clean Water Act also affords the public .access to pollution
11
d~ta subject to the trade secret exception.

Public environmental information laws have grown in popular
and legal prominence since the early 1980's when citizen suits
under federal pollution control laws increased dramatically. 12 Concurrent with the increased availability of public information, the
perceived usefulness of environmental information laws has also
gained recognition. Yet, little thought and comprehensive analysis
_have been dedicated to the possible policy roles and pathologies of
13
these laws.
7. 42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (1982).
8. /d. § 7414(a)(l)(A)-(E).
9. Id. § 7414(c).
10. 33 U.S.C. § 1318(a)(4)(A) (1982).
11. /d. § 1318(b).
12. See generally Blomquist, Rethinking the Citizen as Prosecutor Model of Environmental Enforcement Under the Clean Water Act: Some Overlooked Problems of OutcomeIndependent Values, 22 GA. L. REv. 337 (1988); Boyer & Meidinger, Privatizing Regulatory
Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under Federal Environmental
Laws, 34 BuFFALO L. REV. 833, 835 (1985) (assessing the potential effects of the rise of private regulatory enforcement proceedings and speculating on how this realignment might
affect the regulatory process); Fadil, Citizen Suits Against Polluters: Picking Up the Pace,
9 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 23 (1985).
13. See infra notes 14-50 and accompanying text.
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Possible Policy Roles

Four discernible policy roles exist for affording the public access to environmental information produced by private industry
and governmental analysis: (1) helping private individuals and
communities minimize health risks; (2) promoting economic accountability by particular businesses for the residuals they created;
(3) pressuring business to reduce or eliminate harmful environmental contaminants; and (4) enhancing certain process values
that are inherent in American democracy .
•

1.

The Individual Risk Minimization Role

In theory, access to information about environmental contaminants enables individuals and community groups to take appropriate action to minimize adverse health risks. Appropriate action in
response to this information might include: (a) avoiding areas
where harmful pollutants are located; (b) minimizing exposure to
contaminated media, for example, by drinking bottled water in
areas where water discharges exceed permitted levels, or by staying
indoors in nonattainment air quality regions; or (c) using the political and legal systems to pressure business to stop or reduce
pollution.
2.

The Economic Accountability Role

Public environmental information laws may also be useful to
recapture a company's economic benefit gained by its failure to
14
control the release of residuals into the environment. A business
can choose to invest its retained earnings in technological improvements that will reduce residuals or use them for other purposes.
These other purposes may include higher wages for workers,
greater dividends for shareholders, and increased bonuses for managers. Therefore, if a private enterprise chooses any of these latter
alternatives, public information concerning the quantity and qual14. A residual is:
[a] nonproduct (material or energy) output, the value of which is less than
the costs of collecting, processing, and transporting it for use. Thus, the definition is time dependent, that is, it is a function of (1) the level of technology
in the society at the point in time and (2) the relative costs of alternative
inputs at that point in time. For example, manure in the United States is
now a residual, whereas thirty or so years ago it was a valuable raw material.
A. KNEESE & B. BowER. ENVIRONMENTAL QuALITY AND RESIDUALS MANAGEMENT, 6 n.1 (1979).
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ity of pollutants can assist in holding that enterprise accountable
for reduction in property values in the surrounding community, increased medical expenses from acute and chronic diseases, and
diminution in the quality of life in the proximity of a plant.

3.

The Action-Forcing Role

A legal mandate requiring public availability of environmental
information, produced by either private industry or governmental
agencies, may indu~e businesses to improve their operations and
reduce harmful environmental contaminants. By way of scientific
16
analogy, this action-forcing policy role is akin to potential energy;
by contrast, the individual risk minimization and economic accountability roles are in the nature of kinetic energy. 16 Businesses
subject to public environmental information laws may be encouraged as a result of press coverage of corporate irresponsibility
to modernize their operations and to take environmental responsibilities more seriously than they might otherwise be inclined to do.
4.

The Process-Enhancing Role

In addition to serving substantive policy roles, public environmental information laws can also function to enhance important
17
process values of American democracy. First, participatory governance can be fostered because citizens are given the opportunity
to become involved in monitoring dischargers and acting as watch·
dogs over government environmental enforcement activity. Second,
the value of process legitimacy can be enhanced because a climate
of openness tends to bolster public confidence in the administrative monitoring_and enforcement scheme.
•

Third, public environmental information laws have the capacity to advance humaneness and respect for individual dignity because individuals are given "fair access to legal processes on an
15. Potential energy may be defined as the energy derived from position rather than
motion. WEBSTER's II NEw RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 920 (1984).
16. Kinetic energy may be defined as energy associated with motion. /d. at 605. In this
context, kinetic energy refers to social outcomes produced by individual litigation, governmental regulation, or political action.
17. See generally Blomquist, supra note 12, at 344-51. According to Professor Robert
Summers, "[l]egal systems operate through various legal processes, including processes for
designating officials, for creating law, for applying it, for enforcing remedies, and for imposing sanctions., Summers, Evaluating and I mprouing Legal Processes - A Plea for Process
Values, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 1, 1 (1974).
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In general, environmental public information laws may give
23
rise to eight policy "pathologies": (1) lack of coordination, (2)
conflict over goals, (3) hyperactivity, (4) faulty informational re-

•

18. Blomquist, supra note 12, at 348 (footnote omitted) .
19. ld. at 348·49.
20. I d. at 350.
21. ld.
22. ld. at 351. See also Huff. Protecting Due Process and Civic Friendship in the Administrative State, 42 MONT. L. REv. 1 (1981).
23. See generally, B. Hoowoon & B. PETERS, THE PA1'HOLOGY OF PuBLIC POLICY (1985).
Hogwood and Peters base their book on an analytical taxonomy of certain pathologies of
policymaking. The use of this medical metaphor provides a framework for the categorization
of the "diseases" of certain public policies and contributes to an understanding of policy
dysfunctions. In an analogous way, the concept of policy pathologies is similar to the more
general policy concept of second-order consequences. See supra note 3.

565

Public Informatio·n Mandates

1990]

ceptors, (5) failures in communicating information to decisionmakers, (6) government learning disabilities, (7) pathologies
arising from attempts to improve existing information, and (8) informational placebo effects.
1.

Lack of Coordination

The first pathology consists of a lack of coordination among
state and federal governmental enforcement officials and citizen
groups. Certain environmental protection policies of state and federal governmental enforcement officials arguably suffer negative
26
24
consequences because of the "countervailing impacts'' of citizen-initiated actions. These actions have proliferated under the
Clean Water Act in the 1980's, encouraged by widespread public
access to discharge monitoring reports and notices of violations
filed by permit holders under the National Pollution Discharge
26
Elimination System (NPDES). Similar coordination problems
can also result from other environmental public information laws.
2.

Conflict Over Goals

Environmental information laws may produce "fundamental
27
goal conflicts" among government agencies, p-r ivate industry, and
members of the public. For example, one goal conflict exists between citizen groups, environmental agencies, and private industry.
When prosecuting cases for civil penalties under the Clean Water
Act, these citizen groups possess differing interests and agendas
than do agencies &nd private industry. Disclosure of environmental
information regarding industry efforts to meet discharge stan.d ards
may lead to responses of citizen groups that risk undermining le•

24. Blomquist, supra note 12, at 407-21. These negative consequences were engendered
by specific legal rules which, among other things:
· allow private parties with no prior involvement in administr~t.tive enforcement negotiations, who have suffered no palpable personal or property injury, to seek substantial monetary fines ... ;
~ provide an unrealistically short period of time for government officials to
ponder the merits of ·a penalty enforcement action ... ;
- tend to discourage further negotiation and concilia_tion betwe.e n government
and industry, while perversely dissuading government officials from providing
input into crucial issues . . . .
/d. at 412 (citations omitted).
25. B. HOGWOOD & B. PETERS, supra note 23, at 44.
26. See supra note 12.
27. Jd. at 46.
•
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28

gitimate government regulatory goals. While Congress intended
citizen groups to fill the void of recalcitrant government enforce29
ment agencies, it is unlikely that Congress anticipated or endorsed goal conflicts that would be counterproductive to fair and
effective environmental regulation between private citizen groups
30
and public agencies.

3.

Hyperactivity

In the realm of environmental information laws, hyperactivity
by government regulators in response to pressure by an inflamed
public can prove dysfunctional and pathological. As explained by
Professors Hogwood and Peters in more generic terms:
[The pathological public policy characteristic of hyperactivity] is manifested in the need of some agencies to promulgate
rules and regulations ... but may go beyond that. As well as
merely making more rules, organizations may attempt to do
something even if something is not required, or even if the
action may be counterproductive. Organizations concerned
with a particular policy area may believe they have more than
a watching brief over the area, and that they are required to
respond to any problems which arise. 31
4.

Faulty Informational Receptors

Public environmental information laws necessitate that gov32
ernment utilize informational receptors. Government "failure to
design [suitable] information collection procedures in advance may
lead to inadequate information being available when problems be•

•

28. Cf. Blomquist, supra note 12, at 407-21 (negative impacts of citizen as ·prosecutor
model under the Clean Water Act regarding federal and state government enforcement and
facilitation of trust and support between government regulators and industry).
29. Pursuant to 33 U .S.C. § 1365 (1982 & Supp. V 1987) citizens may sue water polluters for injunctive relief and civil penalties upon meeting a sixty-day notice provision of
their intention to file suit. However, no citizen suit is actionable under the Clean Water Act:
[l]f the Administrator or State has commenced .and is diligently prosecuting
a civil or criminal action in a court of the United States, or a State, to require
compliance with the standard, limitation, or order, but in any such action in
a court of the United States any citizen may intervene as a matter of right.
ld. § 1365(b)(l)(B) (1982) .
30. See generally Blomquist, supra note 12, at 403-07.
31. B. Hocwooo & B. PETERS, supra note 23, at 55.
32. See generally id. at 63.
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come ~urrent. " 33 Indeed, with faulty environmental information receptors in place, "in times of crises ~ .". . [private and public] organi34
zation[s] may suffer from information overload. " In .a related
way, "there is a danger that as a result of inertia (or lack of any
thinking about policy relevance when the administrative data collection system was designed) inappropriate or inadequate sources
35
of data may be generating misleading signals. "
Because of the complexity of managing environmental information, it is arguable that "policy analysts should not actively engage in seeking out new information and new problems for government, since this would entail increasing the demands on the
political system without necessarily increasing the resources to
meet those demands . . . or the capacity of the political system to
resolve issues."36 Moreover, "[e]qually daunting is the task of filtering out erroneous information" 3·7 by government policy~akers,
private citizens, and business executives.
33. I d. at 64.
34. Id. at 63. This can be particularly troublesome in some policy contexts. For example, '' [d]esigning procedures for regulating the amount, kind, and sources of information
transmitted within and between organizations engaged in emergency management is central
to timely, informed choice by organizational decisionmakers~" Comfort, Designing Policy
For Action: The Emergency Management System, in MANAGING DISASTERS: STRATEGIES AND
POLICY PERSPECTIVES 18 (L. Comfort ed. 1988) (hereinafter MANAGING DISASTERS]. Indeed,
different types of policy problems require different types of organizational information
receptors:
[T]he decisionmaking process for emergency organizations is distinctly differ·
ent under emerge11cy conditions than in routine operations. In an emergency,
problems are ill-structured. Environmental conditions are changing and dynamic. Numbers of clientele involved expand and contract dramatically.
Time is critical, and complexity increases geometrically with the degree of
interaction among participants and conditions. Systematic methods of decisionmaking., based upon orderly search of all possible alternatives for action,
prove less effective in complex environments than "rules of thumb" or heuristic decision processes.... The· function of design in emergency decisionmaking processes is to structure the elements of decision-information,
timing,
.
known constraints, interaction among participants in a process that is likely
to yield the most appropriate choice in the most ti~ely fashion.
!d.. at 16 (footnotes omitted). See also Comfort & Cahill, Increasing Problem·Solving Capacity Between Organizations: The Role of Information in Managing the May 31, 1985
Tornado Disaster in Western Pennsylvania, in MANAGING DISASTERS, supra, at 180
(stressing the importance of open How of information, interpersonal communication and
trust, articulation of professional goals and norms, and systematic feedback mechanisms).
35. B. HoGwooo & B. PETERS, supra note 23, at 66.
36. /d. at 67.
37. /d. at 68.
•

•
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5. Failures in Communicating Information to Decisionmakers
Public environmental information laws mandate that great
quantities of information be made available to the public. The
quality of this information becomes problematic when juxtaposed
with independent, and sometimes confidential, government, citizen, and industry information sources. Due to the substantial
quantity and variable quality of information, these laws may pose
a risk of pathological policy outcomes if appropriate information is
not communicated to private or public decisionmakers. Unfortunately, it is an administrative reality that
•

•

[m]uch of the information which is collected [within a single
organization] never reaches. the parts of an organization
which would find it most useful. Such failures of communication can be vertical (i.e. failure of front-line subordinates to
report relevant information to ·superiors) or horizontal, as
wh·en a line unit fails to pass on information about opportuni38
ties to, say, a research or policy analysis section.

This pathological policy results in public and private decisionmakers receiving information in a garbled form with the jamming of the overall information network. This may occur with varying degrees and "drastic consequences for the functioning of the
39
network as a whole may occur."

Government Learning Disabilities

6.

•

"One of the major pathologies of modern public policy is the
failure of government to realize that programs it is delivering are
failing to achieve their objectives or are even acting in a way con40
trary to those objectives." This problem arises because systematic
evaluation is complicated by several variables: (a) "the objectives
41
of [a] program may not have been clearly specified"; (b) the program itself may be poorly understood or ambiguously defined; (c)
"major difficulties may arise in measuring what has or has not
42
happened"; and (d) "the given program is likely to be impacting
on its target clientele in conjunction with a wide range of other
•

38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

I d. at 68 .. 69.
ld. at 71.
I d. at 80.
ld. at 81.
I d. at 82.

•
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influences, including other public policy programs, whose overall
43
effect may be extremely difficult to disentangle."
The difficulty of systematically evaluating the efficacy of environmental information laws is illustrated by the following general
points. Availability and public access of environmental information
are frequently ends in themselves. Separate government environmental policy analysis and enforcement actions compete with private citizen suits and toxic tort actions for access to· the same environmental information. Moreover, it may be problematic to track
how the public uses environmental information.
7.

The Pathological Paradox of "lrrJ.proved" Information

In· any informational system, "[t]here is a danger that improved infoFmation technology may lead to 'hard' quantitative
data driving out 'soft,' but arguably mo·re important, qualitative
data. It is much more difficult to impose the preparation and use
of qualitative assessments than to improve hard information col45
lection and flow.""" According to -Professor Roszak, our capacity
to think creatively about social problems is being undermined by
the very information that is supposed to help us understand it.
Data processing replaces thought; data glut obscures basic questions of justice and purpose. Roszak states:
'

'

Information has taken on the quality of that impalpable, invisible, but plaudit-winning silk from which· the emperor's
ethereal gown was supposedly spu·n. The word has received
ambitious, global definitions that make it all good things to
all people. Words that come to mean everything may finally
mean nothing; yet their very emptiness may allow them to be
filled with a mesmerizing glamour:'$
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id.
/d. at 86.

T. RoszAK, THE CuLT OF

•

INFORMATION

(1986).

Id.
The loose but exuberant talk we hear on all sides these days about "the information economy," "the information society," is coming to have exactly
that function. These often-repeated catch phrases and cliches are the mumbo
jumbo of a widespread public cult. Like all cults, this one also has the intention of enlisting mindless allegiance and acquiescence. People ... have no
clear idea what they mean by information or why they should want so much
of it ....
/d. at x.
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There is a danger in the area of public environmental information laws that more intricate and detailed raw data about pollutants, emissions; ambient concentrations, and media transfers will
be generated for public consumption without a concomitant level
of sophistication in understanding the meaning of the data and its
overall implications for public health, economic progress, and envi·
ronmental sustenance.
8.

Informational. Placebos

A final policy pathology that may ·result from public environmental information laws is the danger that production and widespread access to environmental information may act as a substitute
for substantive environmental policy. "Placebo policie·s are
designed to produce the impression of action with little or no sub7
stance in order to placate those demanding .action. "" Indeed,
''[p]lacebo actions do not merely have a nil effect. The removal of
an issue from the political agenda by the announcement of a placebo policy makes it difficult to get attention paid to arguments for
48
.
more substantive policies."
For example, the Environmental Protection -Agency may publish warnings about natural radon contamination in home basements,49 or advise people to let their drinking .water run for a few
50
extra minutes to minimize lead contamination. In the long run,
however, this type of agency action risks displacing more important collective social .action to resolve problems of environmental
pollution and degradation.
•

.' . .

47. B. HoGwoon & B.

PETERS,

supra note 23, at 172.

48. Id. at 173.

Further, the "lulling effect" produced by the belief that a problem is being
dealt with might enable the problem to deteriorate drastically in the
meantime. In the long ru~, symbolic gestures may be worse than nothing.
They may cause disappointment and alienation, and this may cause more
damage than ignoring the problem entirely.

ld. (citations omitted).
.
49. See 3 Tox.. L. Rep. (BNA) 534 (Sept. 21; 1988) (EPA recommends radon testing for
all homes).
.

50. See U.S.

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, LEAD AND YouR DRINKING WATER

(1988). See also 2 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 1415 (May 18, 1988) (EPA warns that lead in drinking water can cause health hazards) .
•
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PuBLIC

INFORMATION PROGRAMS

A. SARA's Public Information Programs
Congress promulgated three regulatory programs in the 1986
SARA legislation that take a proactive approach to environmental
quality by establishing public environmental information programs
that address the presence and dangers of hazardous waste in communities. These programs are: (I) Title III of SARA the federal
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act;rn (2)
Section 110 of SARA, which deals with the preparation of toxicological profiles of designated hazardous substances by the Agency
2
for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR);~ and (3)
Section 117(e) of SARA, which creates a public grant program to
finance technical assistance for groups of individuals affected by
63
releases from certain hazardous waste sites.
1.

SARA Title III: The Emergency Planning and Communit)'
Right-to-Know Act

The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act
64
was passed by Congress as Title III to SARA. The two general
objectives of Title III are to encourage and support emergency
planning efforts by local governments with regard to chemical
hazards, and to provide citizens and local governments with information concerning potential community-based chemical hazards.~
Congress included three provisions within Title III to effectuate
these objectives. The first concerns government emergency response planning. The second provision addresses emergency release notification by private industry. The third requires the com5

•

51. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (Supp. V 1987).
52. See infra notes 79·84 and accompanying text.
53. See infra notes 85-94 and accompanying text.
54. Superfund Amendment and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99499, §§ 301-330, 100 Stat. 1613, 1729 (1986) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001-11050 (Supp. V
1987)). See also supra note 4.
55. See Committee of Conference, Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act
of 1986, H .R. CoNF. REP. No. 962, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 281 (1986) [hereinafter Conference
Committee Report]. See also, 51 Fed. Reg. 41,570 (Nov. 17, 1986). See generally, J.
O'REILLY, EMERGENCY RESPONSE TO CHEMICAL AcciDENTS (1987); Oleinick, Fodor & Susselman, Risk Management for Hazardous Chemicals: OSHA's Hazardous Communication
Standard and EPA's Emergency Planning and Community Right·to·Know Regulations, 9
J. LEGAL MEn. 179 (1988); Comment, Developments in Chemical Emergency Planning Legislation: Toward a Comprehensive Response Program in Ohio, 17 CAP. U.L. REv. 143 (1983).

•
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pilation

and reporting of information concerning chemical
properties~ manufacturing, usage, properties, and release.
.

The first provision of Title III requires the governors of the
various states to have established a state emergency response com56
mission by April 17, 1987. State commissions are also required to
have established emergency planning districts no later than July
57
17, 1987, and to have appointed local emergency planning com58
mittees for each district by August 17, 1987.
Each local committee is required to have completed preparation of an emergency response plan, no later than October 17,
1988, containing the following information: ·
1) facilities within the district at which any one of numerous

statutorily designated "extremely hazardous s.u bstances" at
"threshold planning quantities" are present;~9
2) methods and procedures for reporting a release of an extremely hazardous substance;
3) names of community and facility coordinators;
4) public notification procedures;
5) methods for determining the occurrence of a release and
the geographic area or population likely to be impacted;
6) the available emergency equipment and facilities within
the community;
7) training programs; and
8) evacuation plans. 60
.

"Congress intended the local planning process to be a truly community-based activity, and not simply an exercise carried out by a
few representatives of industry and the gove:r nment bureaucracy in
61
a back room at city hall."
The second component of Title III the emergency release notification provisions requires the owner or operator of a "facil56. SARA § 30l(a), 42 U.S., C. § 11001(a) (Supp. V 1987).
57. ld. § 301(b), 42 U.S.C. § 11001(b).
58. Id. § 301(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11001(c) (committees to be appointed by August 17, 1987t
or thirty days after the designation of emergency planning districts, whichever was earlier).
59. SARA §§ 302(a)(2) &. 303(c), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11002(a)(2), 11003(c) (Supp. V 1987).
The list of extremely hazardous substances originally containing 402 substances···-·is set
forth at 40 C.F.R. Part 355, Appendix A. Forty substances were later deleted from the initial
list. See 52 Fed. Reg. 48,072, 48,075 (Dec. 17J 1987); 53 Fed. Reg. 5574 (Feb. 25, 1988).
60. SARA § 303(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11003(c) (Supp. V 1987).
61. G. LowRY & R. LowRY, LowRY's HANDBOOK OF RIGHT·TO-KNow AND EMERGENCY
PLANNING 124 (1988).
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ity"62 to provide notification of a hazardous substance release63
within any affected area to the community emergency coordinator
of the local committee and to the affected state's commission.64
The statute mandates that the notification contain specific information. This information must include data about the chemical re66
leased,65 the estimated quantity of the hazardous substance, "the
6
time and duration of the release," ~ "[a]ny known or anticipated
acute or chronic health risks associated with the emergency and,
wher-e appropriate, advice regarding medical attention necessary
for exposed individuals,''68 precautions to be taken in response to
69
the release, and pertinent details regarding the contact person
who can provide further information. 70
The final provision is perhaps the most important public ,environmental information mandate under Title III. This provision
contains reporting requirements for chemical usage, chemical
properties, manufacturing, and environmental releases. "In order
to inform citizens about chemicals located in their communities,
Title III requires the owners and operators of certain facilities to
submit three types of information concerning such chemicals to
71
state and local authorities." This information entails: (a) material
72
safety data sheets (MSDS) and hazardous chemicallists; (b) haz62. A "facility" is defined, for purposes of emergency release notification, as including
motor. vehicles, r.olling stock, or aircraft. See 40 C.F.R. § 355.20 (1988) .
63. The hazardous substance must be of a "reportable quantity" of either an extremely
hazardous substance or a hazardous substance as defined by CERCLA § 102, 42 U.S.C. §
9602(a), unless the release results in exposure to persons solely within the boundaries of a
site on which a facility is located or is a federally permitted release as defined under CER·
•
CLA. SARA § 304(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(a) (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(a)(2) (1988).
64. SARA § 304(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(l) (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(1)
(1988).
65. SARA § 304(b)(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(A); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(1).
66. SARA § 304(b)(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(C); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(iii).
67. SARA § 304(b)(2)(D), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(D); 40 C.F;R. § 355.40(b)(2)(iv).
68. SARA § 304(b)(2)(F), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(F); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(vi).
69. SARA § 304(b)(2)(G), 42 U.S.C § 11004(b)(2)(G); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(vii).
70. SARA § 304(b)(2)(H), 42 U.S.C. § 11004(b)(2)(H); 40 C.F.R. § 355.40(b)(2)(viii).
See also, G. LowRY & R. LowRY, supra note 61, at 129-30.
71. 2 THE LAw oF HAZARDous WASTE§ 10.01[4J[a] at 10-8 (8. Cooke, ed. 1988) (hereittafter 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE).
72. With certain technical exceptions, any facility required to prepare MSDS's under
the Occupational Safety and He~lth Administration's (OSHA) Hazardous Communication
Standard is governed by Title Iii reporting requirements if a threshold quantity, as defined
by EPA, of a substance defined as a hazardous chemical is present at the facility. SARA §,§
311(a)(l), (b), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021(a)(l), (b) (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. §§ 370~20, 370.21(a),
(b) (1988). SARA § 311(a)(l), 42 U.S.C. § 11021(a)(l) (Supp. V 1987); 40 C.F.R. §§
370.21(a), (b) (1988). See also 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200(g) (1987) (material safety data sheet
'
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ardous chemical inventory information;73 and (c) toxic chemical usage, manufacture, and release information.'"
All three components of Title III government emergency response planning, emergency release notification procedures, and
chemical inventory and usage reporting are accessible to the public. Three specific public environmental information policies promote this accessibility: first, public participation requirements for
local emerge11cy response committees' formulation of emergency
response plans;7 & second, liberal public availability of local facility
·records (emergency response plans, follow-up emergency release
notification, MSDS's, inventory forms, lists of hazardous chemi76
cals, toxic chemical release forms); and, third, the EPA's development of a national computerized toxic chemical inventory
77
database. Moreover, citizen suit provisions create "the possibility
of community self.. help enforcement of SARA Title III by allowing
suits against the facility owners or ope~ators, state and local governments, or the EPA. " 78
requirements).
73. The owner or operator of any facility subject to the chemicallisting/MSDS submission requirements of Title III is also required to comply with annual inventory mandates.
SARA §§ 311(d)(2). 312(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11021(d)(2), 11022(a)(l) (Supp. V 1987). These
requirements provide that by March 1 of each year, the facility owner or operator must
prepare and submit a "tier I" or "tier II" inventory reporting form that provides information on any hazardous chemical present at the facility in a threshold quantity during the
previous year. 40 C.F.R. §§ 370.20(b)(2), 370.21(c)(l), 370.25 (1988).
74. For manufacturing facilities with U.S. Department of Commerce Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) numbers 20 through 39, Title III requires that the facility submit a
yearly toxic chemical release report. SARA § 313(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(a) (Supp. V 1987).
This requirement is limited to (a) facilities which have ten or more. full-time employees and
(b) which used, manufactured, or released a threshold quantity of any of 329 toxic chemicals
which have been listed as causing, or anticipated to cause, significant adverse human health
effects, various chronic human health effects, or adverse effects on the environment. 40
C.F.R. § 372.22 (1988). The initial list of chemicals contained 209 specific chemicals and .20
chemical compound categories. SARA § 313(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c) (Supp. V 1987); 40
C.F.R. § 372.65 (1988). The EPA is given administrative discretion to add or delete from
this list, and any person may petition the EPA to take such action. SARA §§ 313(d), (e), 42
U.S.C. §§ 11023(d), (e) (Supp. V 1987).
75. See supra notes 59-60 .and accompanying text.
76. See SARA § 324(a), 42 U.S.C. § 11044(a) (Supp. V 1987). See also SARA §§ 303,
304, 31l(c)(2), 312(e)(3), 313(c), 313(h), 324(a), 42 U.S.C. §§ 11003, 11004, 11021(c)(2),
11022(e)(3), 11023(c), 11023(h), 11044(a) (Supp. V 1987).
77. SARA § 313(j), 42 U.S.C. § 11023(j) (Supp. V 1~87). See also 53 Fed. Reg. 6567
(Mar. 9, 1988) (notice of public meeting to discuss options for making information
available).
78. G. LOWRY & R. Lowav, supra note 61, at.161. Title III follows the "citizen as prosecutor" model by permitting citizen suits for civil penalties as well as injunctive relief. SARA
§ 326(c), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(c) (Supp. V 1987). See generally Blomquist, supra note 12.

•
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Section 110: ATSDR Toxicological Profiles and National
Priorities List (NPL) Health Assessments

In section 110 of SARA Congress added substantially to the
79
responsibilities of the ATSDR. The ATSDR is now required
within five years after the enactment of SARA to identify, develop,
and update toxicological profiles regarding each of the 275 hazard8
ous substances most commonly found at Superfund sites. ° Consistent with its past actions in setting firm and ambitious deadlines
for the EPA, Congress directed the ATSDR to prepare 100
81
8
profiles within the first six months after SARA's enactment. ~ In
addition, section 110 requires the ATSDR to perform health as83
sessments for each facility on the NPL. "When such health assessments indicate that exposure at a site presents a significant
risk to human health, the EPA is directed to take actions such as
providing alternative water supplies and permanently relocating
residents to reduce such exposure and risk. " 84
3.

Section 117(e): Public Technical Assistance Grants

Section 117 of SARA assures public input on the selection of
all proposals for cleanup remedies of abandoned hazardous waste
Importantly, the citizen suit provision provides in pertinent part for "other rights" of
citizens:
Nothing in this section shall restrict or expand any right which any person
(or class of persons) may have under any Federal or State statute or common
law to seek enforcement of any requirement or to seek any other relief ....
SARA § 326(g), 42 U.S.C. § 11046(g) (Supp. V 1987).
79. SARA § 110, 42 U .S.C. § 9604(i) (Supp. V 1987).
80. ld.
81. The toxicological profiles under SARA § 110, "are to include an analysis of all available toxicological and epidemiological evaluations for a hazardous substance to ascertain
levels of human exposure that may trigger adverse health effects and, where appropriate, an
identification of toxicological testing needed to identify levels of exposure that may cause
health concerns." Hayes & MacKerron, Superfund 11: A New Mandate - A BNA Special
Report, 17 Env't Rep. (BNA) 83 (Feb. 13, 1987) (citations omitted).
82. SARA § 110, 42 U.S.C. § 9604(i)(2)(A) (Supp. V 1987).
83. Hayes & MacKerron, supra note 81, at 83.
84. 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 71, § 12.05[2](h) at 12-101.
ATSDR may also perform health assessments in response to petitions where
individuals or physicia.n s provide data on exposure to hazardous substances.
If ATSDR does not initiate a health assessment in response to a petition, it
must provide a written explanation.
Atkeson, Goldberg, Elrod & Connors, An ·Annotated Legislative History of the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), 16 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL L. Inst.)
10,360, 10,393 (1986).
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8

sites on the Superfund NPL. ~ The Administrator or State must
provide a notice and analysis of the proposed cleanup plan suffi86
cient to "provide a reasonable explanation of the proposed plan"
and a ''reasonable opp·o rtunity for submission of written and oral
comments, and an opportunity for a public meeting at or near the
87
[site]" must also be provided. Likewise, notice of the EPA's final
cleanup plan must be published along with a discussion of any significant changes and the reasons for such changes. The EPA must
also reply to significant comments, criticisms, and new data submitted by the public. 8·8
.

Section 117(e) creates a public grant program to support technical assistance and the gathering of information for citizen groups
in the vicinity of sites on the NPL. Under the statute, grants of up
to $50,000 per site "may be used for technical assistance in interpreting information with regard to the nature of the hazard, remedial investigation and feasibility study, record of decision, remedial
design, selection and construction of remedial action, operation
89
and maintenance, or removal action. " Congress intended that
"[s]uch grants are not ... to be used to underwrite legal actions.
However, any information developed through grant assistance may
be used in any legal action affecting the [site J, including any legal
action in a court of law."90 Moreover, while the grant recipient
must contribute at least twenty percent of the cost of the technical
assistance grant, both the $50,000 ceiling and the contribution requirement may be waived by the EPA. No more than one grant
under section 117(e) may be .made for a single site, but Congress
has authorized grant renewal to facilitate public participation at all
1
stages of remedial action.~
Testimony and deliberation before the House of Representatives reveals that Congress responded to citizen demands for
greater public involvement in the Superfund clean-up process by
enacting the new public participation and grant provision of
SARA. Although theoretically the EPA has provided for public
92
participation, the congressional testimony indicated that actual
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

SARA § 117, 42 U.S.C. § 9617 (Supp. V 1987).
Conference Committee Report, supra note 55, at 230.
Jd.
Atkeson, Goldberg, Elrod & Connors, supra note 84, at 10,390-91.
Conference Committee Report, supra note 55, at 231.
ld.
ld.
See 40 C.F.R. § 300.67 (1988) (NCP provisions on community relations).
'
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involvement in site investigation, remedy selection, litigatio·n, and
settlement was primarily limited to the federal government and
93
private potentially responsible parties. In response, Congress concluded that increased public participation was both nec.e ssary and
94
desirable.

B.

The Policy Logic of SARA's Public Information Programs
1.

Title III

SARA's public information programs, particularly the Title III
component, will promote six different policy goals. First, Title III
will produce a baseline of
data [that] can be used to characterize exposure levels, evaluate existing regulatory strategies and develop new ones, focus
on specific locations of concern., identify important chemical
releases and the types of operations they come from, compare
permitted releases to reported releases, and aid in the devel96
opment of waste minimization strategies.

Second, Title III holds promise for acting as "a valuable mechanism for effective emergency management, protecting environmental concerns, offering local citizens the opportunity to have a
significant impact on the safety of their community, and for providing a structured forum in which industry, government, and citi96
zens can work collectively on these issues. "

Third, Title III should be applauded as ''Congress' most significant experiment to involve the private sector and decentralize
environmental problem solving.... [C]itizens [must] be informed
about hazardous materials being stored, handled, or manufactured
in their community, and local communities [must] have a coordinated emergency response plan to respond to chemical
•
97
emergencies. "
Fourth, while the information gathered .in the Title III process
should be viewed as preliminary, and subject. to refinement, this
93. See H.R. Rep. No. 253, 99th Cong., 1st Sess~, pt. 1, 122-23, 131 (1985), reprinted in
1986 U.S. ConE CoNe. & ADMIN. NEws 2904·05, 2913.
94. /d., at 90-91, reprinted in 1986 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws at 2872-73; id. pt.
5, at 65-66, reprinted in 1986 U.S. ConE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEws 3188·89.
95. Berkowitz, The Law and The Promise, 5 ENVTL. F. 24, 28 (Oct. 1988).
96. Makis, Now It's Everybody's Job, 5 ENVTL. -F. 25, 30 (Oct. 1988).
97. Matsumoto, Confrontation or Compromise?, 5 ENVTL. F. 25, 25 (Oct. 1988).

.
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public environmental information law will "provide Americans
with at least two powerful pictures of the industries that put them
at risk. Total annual discharges from the [Toxic Release Inventory] data will be one picture. Another is the 'plume maps' or 'footprints' of potential chemical gas releases as they travel downwind
98
or downstream." In a related way, the Toxic Release Inventory
99
data generated by the imprimatur of section 313 will promote the
better understanding of two major risk management problems: (a) .
identifying and specifying the "[m]any U.S. chemical plants [that]
do not [currently] use the Best Achievable Control Technology
100
(BACT) to minimize chemical discharges''; and (b) developing
some rudimentary information "regarding chemical discharges
101
once they have left the plant."
.

.

Fifth, the emergence of information regarding toxic chemical
releases and mass balance inventories will, no doubt, serve as
"strong public educational and motivational tools toward the im102
provement of chemical safety.'' Finally, Title III will facilitate
the development of comparative emissions statistics of hazardous
substances that will spur some industrial firms to take a leadership
role by ''openly communicating about risks" 103 with the public in
104
meetings that may reflect a. "new era, and a new partnership."
This industrial leadership has the potential of providing exemplary
corporate models that. will inspire other companies to respond to
106
the
leaders'
efforts.
the competitive
need
to
match
.
Title III of SARA holds considerable promise for being an

ef~

.

· 98. Millart The Beginnings of Chemical Control, 5 ENVTL. F. 26, 32 (Oct. 1988).
99. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
100. Millar, supra note 98,_at 32. "For example, a recent [Chemical Manufacturer's Association (CMA)] study found that some small chemical plants in Louisiana are discharging
greater amounts of toxic chemicals than the much larger, but better equipped plants in
Michigan.'; ld.
101. ld.
People want to know if their family's health will be affected, if pollutants will
come down on their children's schoolyard or on their vegetable garden. Combined with their lack of knowledge regarding health effects, the industry
looks less than socially responsible when, as reported [in the Baton Rouge
pressl ... a CMA consultant says that 'we're not really sure where ... (the
emissions] go, what they mix with, what they turn into, [and) where they
come down.'

I d.
102.
103.
104.
105.

/d.
Young, Nothing To Lose But. Fear Itself, 5
/d. at 33.
Millar, supra note 98, at 26.

ENVTL.

F. 27, 27 (Oct. 1988).
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fective public environmental information law when it is reformulated into the four policy roles discussed in part II of this article.
The most impressive aspect of the statutory scheme is its processenhancing nature. The process value of participatory governance
is advanced by Title III because citizens are provided a significant
stake in learning about specific details concerning the environmental quality of their communities. Process legitimacy is also furthered along with consensualism, and humaneness and respect for
individual dignity. These values are enhanced because community
residents are the.o~etically given equal access to environmental information and are tacitly invited to participate in negotiating improvements with area businesses regarding specific measures of en~
vironmental improvement.
Title III's impact on other process values, however, is more
problematic. While civic friendship is specifically acknowledged by
bringing citizens into the information loop in conjunction with industrial and governmental representatives, it is debatable whether
public openness and truth-telling process values will be enhanced.
Fulfillment of both of these latter values depend upon knowledgeable and informed public involvement. In its current form, Title III
make·s no provision for systematic education and training of citizen
groups to understand the welter of chemical data and mass balance
information that businesses will be reporting to local emergency
response committees. Thus, it will be difficult, if not impossible,
for untrained citizen activists to discern exaggeration in reporting
improvement in environmental quality and the decreased use and
dissemination of chemical substances. The attainment of truthtelling will be haphazard at best without a firm statutory provision
to penalize false and misleading data reporting.
Disparities between the availability of raw information and
the ability to clearly understand its significance also bear on the
efficacy of Title III in achieving the substantive policy roles 'of risk
minimization, economic accountability and corporate action-forcing. To the extent that chemical emissions information is crudely
or incompletely linked to actual human exposure and medical risk,
individuals will be hampered in their abilities to take responsible
actions to minimize these risks and stymied in holding specific
firms accountable ·ror causing medical injury, diminished life quality, and reduced property values.
It is questionable whether Title III will force action by laggard
firms without more coercive laws focused on measurable environ-

•
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106

mental improvements. The efforts of several socially responsible
businesses enterprises to follow the lead of innovative firms in reducing hazardous waste generation and emissions should not be
considered dispositive.

2.

Sections 110 & 117(e)
.

107

Section 110 will generate much interesting and potentially
useful data. For example, in response. to the mandate of section
110, ATSDR has already generated draft toxicological profiles for,
numerous hazardous substances, including the following: benzene,
selected PCB's, nickel, chloroform, chrysene, arsenic, aldrin/dialdrin, dioxin~ beryllium, chromium, methylene chloride, cadmium,
tetrachloroethylene, cyanide, vinyl chloride, trichloroethylene, and
108
lead.
Consistent guidelines for publication of toxicological
109
profiles have been jointly developed by the EPA and ATSDR.
The introduction to each profile sets forth the general rese_a rch approach, explanation of research gaps, and the anticipated audiences for the toxicological information. ATSDR notes, in this
regard:
.

.

.

Each toxicological profile begins with a public health
statement, which de.s crib,e s in nontechnical language a substance's relevant toxicological properties. Following the statement is material that presents levels of significant human exposure and, where known, significant health effects. The
adequacy of information to determine a substance's health effects is described in a health effects summary. Research gaps
in toxicologic and health effects information are described in
the profile. . . .

The principal audiences for the toxicological profiles are
health professionals at the federal, state, and local levels, in106. According to Garrett Hardin, "social arrangements that produce responsi!lility are
arrangem.e nts that create coercion." Hardin, The Tra,gedy of the Commons, 162 Set. 1243
(1968),, reprinted in T. ScHOENBAUM, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY LAw 19, 23 (1985). Cf. Blomquist, Beyond the EPA and OTA Reports: Toward a Comprehensive Theory and Approach
to Hazardous Waste Reduction in America, 18 ENVTL. L. 817 ,, 875, 894-95 (1988).
107. See supra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
108. On April17, 1987, ATSDR and EPA published the 100 most significant hazardous
substances commonly found at superfund sites on the NPL. See 52 FED. REG. 12,869 (Apt.
17, 1987). See also Johnson, Health Effects of Hazardous Waste: The Expanding Funct'ion
of the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Regi"stry, 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L.
Inst.) 10,132, 10,138 (Apr. 1988) (listing 100 substances).
109. 52 FED. REG. 12,869 (Apr. 17, 19,87).
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terested private sector organizations and groups, and members of the public. We plan to revise these documents [at
least every three years] in response to public comments ....
that will make the toxicological profile series of the greatest
use.tlo

,

Each toxicological profile published by ATSDR presents information in a format that can be useful to laypersons and scientifically trained specialists. One of the most publicly useful portions
of each profile is the public health statement, contained in the first
chapter of each report. The public health statement presents complicated scientific information on each hazardous substance by answering seven basic questions. For example, with regard to the hazardous substance benzene, the ATSDR public health statement
answers the following questions:
1) What is Benzene?
2} How might I be exposed to Benzene?

3) How does Benzene get into my body?
4) How can Benzene affect my health after brief exposures at
high levels, or long-term exposures at various levels?
5) Is there a medical test to determine whether I have been
exposed to Benzene?
6) What levels of exposure have resulted in harmful health
effects?
7) What recommendation has the federal government made
to protect human health? 111

Moreover, pursuant to section 110 of SARA, the ATSDR has
commenced developing a comprehensive national exposure registry
112
of persons exposed to hazardous substances. The rationale for
developing this registry indirectly bears on public environmental
information. The ATSDR noted the following in a recent report:
When considering environmental health issues, of particular
concern is the lack of information on the effects of low-level
exposures of long duration, the exposures typically found for
the population surrounding hazardous waste sites. Also, very
limited data are available on the health outcomes for the
110. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. Public Health Service,
Toxicological Profile for Benzene iv (Dec. 1987)~
111. /d. at 1-3.
112. See generally Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry, U.S. Public
Health Service, Policies and Procedures for Establishing a National Registry of Persons Exposed to Hazardous Substances: National Exposure Registry 3 (1988).
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•

populations receiving a one-time, high-level environmental
exposure such as that experienced at chemical spill sites. Registries can be a valuable tool in addressing the potential
health outcomes of both types of exposures.
. . . In addition to facilitating research, the registry activities can further serve public health by being of direct service
or benefit to the registrants. This goal can be accomplished
by keeping the registrants informed of relevant research,
medical interventions, or preventative measures related to
13
their exposure!
•

Because of the EPA's delay in implementing regulations for
Technical Assistance Grants, section 117(e) of SARA, compared to
Title III and section 110, is still in its nascent stage of implementa114
These grants hold great potential for permitting citizen
tion.
groups to interpret scientific and regulatory data about Superfund
sites. Certain features of the program, however, suggest that bureaucratic provisions may hamper their widespread availability
and a full understanding of cleanup options.
Specifically, the EPA would require citizen groups seeking
these grants to show that the group is "threatened" by the site
from a health, economic, or environmental standpoint. 115 Along
with this ambiguous task, these citizen groups which will have to
be nonprofit organizations must demonstrate to the EPA's satisfaction that they have established reliable procedures for record
116
keeping and financial accountability in grant management.
Technical advisors selected to help citizen groups would be required to possess certain credentials, including a demonstrated
knowledge of hazardous waste issues and academic training in a
relevant discipline such as biochemistry, toxicology, environmental
sciences, or engineering. 117 The EPA's proposed procedures would
also require that these scientific experts be able to translate tech113. /d. (emphasis ad~ed). Cf. Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry for
Health Assessments and Health Effects Studies of Hazardous Substances Releases and Facilities, 53 FED. REG. 32,259 (1988) (to be codified at 42 C.F.R. pt. 90) (proposed Aug. 24,
1988).
114. See 2 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 19 (June 3, 1987) (EPA accused of delay by Sen.
Lautengerg in issuing community action grant guidelines). See also 3 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA)
660 (Oct. 19, 1988) (EPA finally announces first four Superfund community action grants
after several months of harsh criticisms).
115. 53 FED. REG. 9736 (Mar. 24, 1988).
116. I d. at 9737-38.
117. Id. at 9745-46.
•
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n,ical information into terms understood by laypersons. 1. To the
EPA's credit, the agency "plans to provide guidance materials to
aid citizens in understanding the grant program and procedures.
These materials include a Citizens' Guidance Manual for the
Technical Assistance Grant Program, three videotapes, and train~
ing, workshops, and fact sheets on various aspects of the
program." 119
1 8

•

Sections 110 and 117(e) of SARA both have potential for being
effective public environmental info.r mation. laws wher1 evaluated in
terms of the four policy roles discusse·d above. Both sections mirror
the focus of Title III on process values by ameliorating participatory governance, process legitimacy, consensualism, and humaneness and respect for individual dignity. Moreover, the presence of process intermediaries an expert public health assessment
agency and professional consultants differentiate these public information programs from the raw information reporting mechanism of Title III. Accordingly, it is likely that the ATSDR toxicological profile program and the EPA Technical Assistance Grant
Program have greater potential than Title III of SARA to enhance
process values in truth-telling and public openness, assuming that
political motivations to manipulate the significance of scientific
data and to reduce available funding can be overcome. To the extent, however, that the ATSDR or technical information consultants do a poor job in communicating technical information and
options to the public, the process value of civic friendship will be
compromised.
Sections 110 and 117(e) h·old considerable promise for improving individual risk minimization and corporate economic accountability because the language and structure of the provisions establish a careful and systematic legal structure for information
gathering. Presumably, good scientific inform-a tion and· technical
analysis will lead individuals to make rational risk assessments
about the dangers related to hazardous waste exposure and reasonable monetary settlements with those firms responsible for causing
medical or property damage. Sections 110 and 117(e) may be
counterproductive to achieving a meanin.gful action-forcing role to
the extent that business' fears are realized regarding public abuse
of information laws by the plaintiffs' bar pursuing unjustified liti118. I d; at 9736.
119. 18 Envtl. L. Rep. (EnvtL L. Inst.) 2366 (Mar. 25, 1988).

'
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gation. Cons.e quently, industry may opt to wage a legal war fighting off tort claimants rather than engage in thoughtful hazardous
waste reduction and risk minimization measures .
•

III.

THE PoLICY LIMITS OF

SARA's HAzARDous

SuBSTANCE

INFORMATION PROVISIONS

Utilizing the potential policy pathologies suggested earlier in
this analysis, what are the specific deficiencies of the tripartite hazardous information provisions of SARA? What detailed problems
can be anticipated from the policy interaction between Title Ill,
section 110, and ·s ection 117(e) by employing the metaphor of
upathology"?
.

First, Congress did not give much attention to coordinating
the various public environmental information provisions of SARA
inter se or with preexisting state law. For example, before Congress enacted Title Ill, several states and local governm·e nts had
already established community right-to-know programs and emer120
gency management networks. With one narrow exception, Congress specifically provided that Title III should not preempt these
121
state and local laws. The question remains as to whether multiple environmental public information requirements are cost-effec.
tive and useful.
Similarly, Congress inadequately addressed two issues regarding the mass of information created by Title III's chemical usage
and mass balance requirements, section llO's toxicological profiles
and health effects studies, and section 117(e)'s technical assistance
grants. First, Congress failed to resolve whether this information
could be used in toxic tort .s uits. By way of specific illustration,
several members of Congress insisted in debate that the information generated by toxicological profiles and health assessments was
intended only for scientific and regulatory purposes, and not tort
litigation-.. No statutory provision of SARA, howeve.r, contains this
purported exclusion. With respect to the second issue, Congress
did not indicate how this information could be used in the tort
120. See Millar, supra note 98, at 28 (discussing New Jersey's programs).
121. SARA § 321, 42 U~S.C. § 11401 (Supp. V 1987)~ State and local laws enacted after
August 1? 1985. requiring_the submission of MSDS's are to require that the MSDS be identical in form and content to those required under Title III. /d. States and local governments
are specifically authorized to require additional MSDS information through the use of additional sheets or other appropriate means. ld.
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context. It is conceivable, therefore, that a private tort plaintiff
could utilize the public record exception contained within Federal
Rule of Evidence 803(8)(c) to admit as hearsay ATSDR findings on
toxicity or health effects. A tort plaintiff could also cite Federal
Rule of Evidence 703 for the proposition that "ATSDR's profiles
and health assessments, although arguably inadmissible for other
reasons, may nevertheless form the basis of [an] expert's opinion
so long as ... experts in his particular field of competence rely on
122
the profiles and health assessments in formi~g their opinions.''

Q

Second, as a partial consequence of lack of policy coordinat~on, the public environmental
information provisions
of SARA os.
.
tensibly conflict with other policy goals. Generally, policy conflicts
occur because of the strong emphasis on protecting public health
provided by public environmental information programs of SARA.
The ATS.D R's responsibilities under section 110 and the public
participation rights under section 117(e), pose serious tensions
with other sections of SARA that mandate expedited remedial action at hazardous waste sites ..
In SARA, Congress took major strides toward making
public health the primary focus of the Superfund program .
Given the paramount importance of public health questions,
this is a welcome development. For the regulated community,
the environmental community, and government agencies
charged with implementing the new provisions, there are
great challenges presented by the need to reconcile the health
goals of the Act with other goals, especially the need for rapid
remedial action . Such potential conflict is vexing, particularly
when one considers that a public health threat might be
heightened because selection of a remedial action is delayed
in order to assemble comprehensive health effects data. 123

Moreover, the policy goals of accuracy and professional consensus, generally employed by the scientific community, are likely
to conflict with the time schedule provisions in section 110. "[T]he
122. Sherwood & Fitzsimmons, The ATSDR: A Plaintiff's Dream Come True?, 2 Tox.
L. Rep. (BNA) 1072, 1078 (Mar. 2, 1988). See also 2 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 265 (July 29, 1987)
(section 110 "creates new field for toxic tort litigation"'); 1 Tox. L. Rep. (BNA) 1257 (Apr. 8,
1987) (SARA said to provide plaintifrs counsel with "motherlode" of health-effects
evidence).
.
123. Strock, Superfund Amended: A New Emphasis on the Public Health, 2 Tox. L.
Re.p. (BNA) 648, 652 (Nov. 4. 1987) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 9616 which imposes new schedules
for Superfund program to the EPA) (footnote omitted).
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ra_p idity with which the ATSDR is required to generate numerous
toxicity profiles and health studies raises a concern as to the qual124
ity and reliability of the resulting data." In addition, strict business re·porting ·r equirements under the emergency notification and
Community Right-to-Know provisions of Title III .h ave the potential to undermine the salutary federal commercial policy of pro126
tecting legitimate trade secrets and proprietary information.
In attempting to comply with the emergency notification
requirements, businesses will face several competing .considerations. On the one hand,. the notice provided might trigger
toxic tort suits based on theories ranging from physical injury to enhanced risk or injury to emotional distress. On the
other hand, if companies do not report the full scope of the
risk presented on the basis of the best information available,
they could face immense civil and criminal penalties. 126

Indeed, an implicit conflict ~ay exist between congressional policy
to encourage voluntary and effective waste reduction and waste
127
minimization rneasures.
A third potential policy pathology of the threefold public environmental information structure of SARA is the anticipated
hyperactivity resulting from the information that the reporting requirements will spur. One commentator has suggested the likelihood of an unintended and .counterproductive linkage between
"Title III data [and] ATSDR's toxicological profiles to create an
128
instant docket of toxic tort suits. ''
Thus, according to this
viewpoint,

•

[T]he information regarding toxic chemical releases required
to be disclosed by Title III could be similar in effect to the
effluent discharge self-reporting required under ' the_ Federal
Clean Water Act, i.e., admissions at the hands of plaintiff attorneys. Thus, there is considerable uncertainty as to how the
129
information generated by the SARA 'programs will be used.
124. 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 71, § 12.05[3](h), at 115-16.
125. /d.
12ft Strock, supra note_123, at 650 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 11045 (Supp. V 1987)) (footnote
omitted). See 20 Envtl. L. Rep. (BNA) 496 (June 30, 1989) (EPA fines 42 companies $1.65
million, citing failure to report toxic discharges).
127. See generally Blomquistt supra note 106.
128. Ruhl, Increased Public Information: How Will It Be Used or Abused?, 3 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T. 32, 33 (Fall 1988).
129. Jd.
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Another knowledgeable observer, focusing on the impact of
publicly available ATSDR data on the proliferation of toxic tort
suits, contends that:
•

•

The mandate of the ATSDR both :t o study the most common
Superfund site contaminants and .to perform health assessments at all NPL sites will generate a great deal of publicly
available chemical toxicity and health risk data. This information is likely to generate significant public concern and
controversy in communities near Superfund sites. It will also
and
potentially
powerful
source
of
provide a readily accessible
.
evidence for toxic tort plaintiffs seeking to prove that their
health problems and risks were caused by contamination from
130
hazardous waste sites.
•

In response to Title III disclosures, an industrial engineer expressed the following concern about government hyperactivity:
Given the lack of resources [from inadequate congressional funding, Title Ill] has the potential to cause the worst
kind of bureaucratic disaster. First, the entire question of how
to control hazardous chemicals is a volatile one. The public
both fears and distrusts industry despite its own ignorance
and unpreparedness to deal with the management of these
chemicals.

•

Industry vehemently opposes outside involvement in
what it views as its own management decisions. Some fear
that [Title III's] directives will lead to further government
controls as the public responds with fear to risks from the
disclosed data. Others are afraid that [Title III] will create a
database that the government will use against them for enforcement purposes. At the very least, they fear that the data
131
will generate unnecessary public concern.
•

Fourth, there are numerous potential information-specific pol132
icy pathologies inherent in the public environmental information
programs of SARA. The prospect of "information overload~' vast
quantities of raw data about chemical use, emissions, and health
effects leading to faulty informational receptors seems to be a
problem caused by the haphazard way that Congress designed the
130. 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 71, § 12.05[3)[h], at ~2-115 (footnote omitted);
see id. n.57.
131. Matsumoto, supra note 97, at 31.
132. See also notes 32-50 and accompanying text.
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programs. While sections 110 and 117 (e) provide the public with
assistance in processing vast quantities of raw data, Title III provides "absolutely no guidance· or assistance ... to local authorities
on how to digest {chemical_ inve.n tory and emissions] information."133 Because Congress and other responsible federal, state, and
local-governmental authorities have not adequately determined the
policy relevance of the deluge of environmental information disclosed to the public, the SARA programs risk developing pathological failure in communicating information to private and public
decisionmakers, government learning disabilities, and pathologies
arising from attempts .to improve existing information. Consequently, the quantity of environmental information does not necessarily lead to qualitative .policy outcomes. In order for qualitative
government policy judgments and public understanding to ensue,
companies which use or store hazardous chemicals in the community, or have been identified. a·s Potentially Responsible Parties at
Superfund sites, will need to explain the risk significance of the
raw data to government officials and private citizens. In order to
do this, it is fundamental that toxicity information be matched
134
with exposure information.
Likewise, it is essential that limitations in available information be explained since "[e]xperience suggests that health risk assessment is at best an inexact and uncertain science, dependent on numerous unverified assumptions, and
that the results of such studies are susceptible to being misinter136
preted and misused. "
Government and business will both risk the pathological pol·
icy outcomes of achieving informational placebos, at best, or litigious and regulatory hyperactivity, at worst, unless they pursue extraordinary outreach efforts in starting the long and arduous
process of e-d ucating the public about the meaning of specific toxicity, health assessment, and chemical usage data generated through
the public hazardous waste information programs. Indeed,
[t]o bring this message home to the [public] requires an indepth, knowledgeable, fairly personalized presentation of the
facts. A proper balance must be struck. On the one hand, the
133. Ruhl, supra note 128, at 33.
134. See Young, supra note 103, at 27 (exploring Monsanto's efforts at accompanying
chemical mass balance information with air·modeling); Millar supra note 98, at 32 ("Worthwhile toxic risk assessment requires a detailed emissions monitoring system of toxic air or
water discharges; a system that could be lacking in as many as 99 percent of American
communities.").
.
135. 2 HAZARDOUS WASTE, supra note 71, § 12.05[3] (h), at 12·115; see id. n.58.
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instruction must impress the audience enough to galvanize
proper preventive behavior; on the other hand, a message that
is either too forceful or hyperbolic will either turn off listeners
or quite pos~ibly make many of them neurotic. The objective
is to make [the public] respond positively to the risk by instilling a reasonable degree of anxiety or apprehension without
engaging in the sort of unfounded exaggeration that engenders irrational responses. 136
CoNCLUSION

The logic and limits of public information mandates under
SARA the chemical usage and mass balance data requirements,
toxicological and health assessment information, and technical assistance grants for citizens living in the vicinity of Superfund sites
-point to the need for government, business, and citizens to build
a relationship of trust. As persuasively articulated in the book Get137
ting Together: Building A Relationship That Gets to Yes, this
will require more than a mere exchange of information and parti136
san perce-p tions about the environmental information.
It will require unconditio.nally constructive interaction which balances emotion with reason, seeks true understanding, listens to opposing
views, exhibits reliability, tries persuasion, and accepts others as
139
worth dealing with and learning from.
Without a relational approach betwe.e n government, business,
and the public, the policy roles of public environmental information laws are less likely to be achieved and their policy pathologies
more likely to result.

136. Harris, Communicating the Hazards of Toxic Substance Exposure, 39 J. OF LEG.
Eouc. 97, 109 (1989) (footnote omitted). Cf. G. LOWRY & R. LOWRY, supra note 61:
Sometimes people are unwilling to accept a situation because they think it is
much riskier than it actually is. Other times, some individuals may be willing
to accept a situation because they think it is much less risky than it actually
is. A large part of the reason for the Right-to-Know movement is to provide
(people] with reliable information about material hazards so they can better
understand the risks and consequently make better decisions.
/d. at 13.
137. See generally R. FISHER & S. BROWN, GETTING ToGETHER: BuiLDING A RELATION'

•

SHIP THAT GETS TO YES (1988).

138. I d. at 25.
139. Id. at 40.

